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DIALOGUE: THE LEGAL
STATUS OF THE PLO
Editor's note: The following articles by Messrs. Friedlander, Levine,
and Kassim relate back to an earlier article by Dr. Kassim, The Pales-
tine Liberation Organization's Claim to Status: A Juridical Analysis
Under International Law, 9 DENVER JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND POLICY 1 (1980).
The PLO and the Rule of Law: A Reply to
Dr. Anis Kassim
ROBERT A. FRIEDLANDER
When the rule of law is being compromised by expediency in many
places of the world, it is crucial ... to make certain that the United
States does not retaliate in kind.1
The destiny of the Palestinian people is determined by the gun of
the Palestinian revolutionary.'
[Tierrorism threatens, endangers or destroys the lives and funda-
mental freedoms of the innocent. .... .
On June 13, 1980, the nine heads of state of the European Economic
Community, meeting in Venice, issued a unanimous declaration favoring
"recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people" and urging
the participation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in the full
exercise of the Palestinian "right to self-determination."4 This was the
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editor of a recent study of self-determination. Ph.D., 1963, Northwestern University; J.D.,
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1. Narenji v. Civiletti, 619 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
2. Statement of Yassir Arafat, quoted in N.Y. Times, June 15, 1980, at 5, col. 3.
3. Report of the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/418, Corr.
1, 2 & Add. 1 (1972).
4. The complete text of the Venice Declaration is reprinted in N.Y Times, June 14,
1980, at 4, col. 3.
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first time the major European leaders had specifically and favorably men-
tioned the PLO in the context of both the Camp David Accords5 and the
Arab-Israeli confrontation, although one could argue that it has been for-
gotten that the twenty-one members of the Council of Europe voted a
similar resolution with no opposition and few abstentions three weeks
earlier.6 The Common Market leaders were not reticent in articulating
their meaning. According to British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher,
the Venice agreement "accepts the PLO as one of the participants that
must be involved in the talks." This has remained the European posi-
tion, only slightly softened at the Venice Economic Summit, notwith-
standing the fact that the PLO leadership disdainfully rejected the Euro-
pean initiative. In the view of Yassir Arafat, the European heads of state
were merely trying to "find a piece of bone that they could throw to us
and keep us busy."'
Not all outside observers were ready to endorse the EEC Declara-
tion.10 Although attempting to be conciliatory and even supportive, the
editorial writers of London's The Economist put it best when they admit-
ted that "[tihe cynical thing to say about the statement is that it will not
affect peace one way or another but may put Europe in the Arab oil pro-
ducers' good books."" To paraphrase the late Harold Ickes, the cat is
finally out of the bag, and it is a shabby animal indeed. Europe is once
again playing power politics, or to use a better term, powerless politics,
and the name of the game is oil. This has led to an increased pessimism
on the part of Israeli politicians such as the former Israeli Deputy Minis-
ter of Finance: "When you make the account between Arab oil and Jew-
ish blood, it's very clear which is heavier.""' And the threat is not only
5. For the texts of the Camp David Agreements of Sept. 17, 1978, see 17 INT'L LEGAL
MAT. 1463 (1978).
6. Miami Herald, Apr. 23, 1980, at 16, col. 1.
7. The Oregonian (Portland), June 14, 1980, at 4, col 1. See also N.Y. Times, June 14,
1980, at 1, col. 1.
8. THE ECONOMIST, June 28, 1980, at 13-14; NEWSWEEK, June 30, 1980, at 16-17; TIME,
June 30, 1980, at 10-11. A favorable summary is provided by Mosettig, Europe's Mideast
"Initiative": But What's Next?, EuRoPE: MAGAZINE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Sept.-
Oct. 1980, at 4.
9. N.Y. Times, June 15, 1980, at 1, col. 3.
10. The United States at first seemed to disassociate itself from the Common Market
d~marche. "Whatever the allies might do about this problem," President Carter observed,
"our position is clear." N.Y. Times, June 15, 1980, at 13, col. 1. Actually, the U.S. position
was, and is, far from clear.
11. THE ECONOMIST, June 21, 1980, at 13. The fact that the PLO jointly and severally is
in continuing violation of the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism,
opened for signature Jan. 27, 1977, has been carefully ignored. The text of the Convention
is reprinted in 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1272 (1976).
12. Quoted in Wall St. J., July 15, 1980, at 14, col. 1. See also Lewis, France Plays Its
Own Game in Wooing the Arab Oil, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1980, at E2, col. 3; Europe and
the PLO, The New Republic, June 14, 1980, at 7; Kedourie, Western Defense in the Middle
East, id., June 7, 1980, at 18; THE ARAB On WAON 4-295 (J. Paust & A. Blaustein eds.
1977); Friedlander, Problems of the Mediterranean: A Geopolitical Perspective, 32 Y.B.
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one of turning off the spigot, but more importantly (even if only implic-
itly) that of blowing up the wellhead. The 1979 statement of Saudi For-
eign Minister Saud al-Faisal is instructive: "The holy places are protected
by God; as for the oil fields, they are protected by man."18
Incredibly, the European leaders chose to ignore the proclamation
Al-Fatah, allegedly the moderate faction of the PLO, issued on June 2,
1980. This proclamation declared that the goal of the PLO would con-
tinue to be "the complete liberation of Palestine [sic), the liquidation of
the Zionist entity [Israel], politically, militarily, culturally and ideologi-
cally, and the establishment of a Palestinian democratic state with Jeru-
salem as its capital. 1 4  The Economist treated this as an unfortunate
faux pas, alluding to the PLO's penchant for "linguistic violence,"16 but
the Misgav-Am incident and the Hebron assassination are symptomatic
of something more than mere flaming rhetoric. It is hard to avoid the
conclusion that "[ilf this document truly reflects a new strategic position
of Fatah and the PLO, it terribly endangers regional and even world
peace. '" The former American Secretary of State, Edmund Muskie, did
not shrink from raising the quintessential issue: "How do you expect
Israel to deal with a group that is bent on its destruction? '17 Can Israel
afford to give diplomatic and legal recognition to an organization which
has vowed to destroy its very existence? In a world where terror is the
ultimate arbiter, then might indeed makes right.
The Palestine Liberation Organization has not changed the nature of
its ideological landscape since it was created at the time of the Arab
League summit conference at Cairo in January 1964. The real initiative
for the establishment of the PLO came not from Palestinian nationalism
but from the political ambitions of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nas-
ser, who even picked the PLO's first leader, Ahmed Shukairy.1 s Originally
WORLD AFF. 175, 175-86 (1978). See generally OIL, THE ARAB-IsRAELi DISPUTE AND THE IN-
DUSTRIAL WORLD (J. Hurewitz ed. 1976); Symposium, Oil Crisis in Perspective, 104 DAEDA-
LUS (R. Vernon ed. 1975).
13. Quoted in Cooley, Iran, the Palestinians, and the Gulf, 57 FOREIGN AFF. 1017, 1027
(1979). Henry Kissinger commented: "[Olnce it is accepted that oil is a political weapon, the
[Arab] moderates have no excuse for not using it as a political weapon." Kissinger,
Nato-The Next 30 Years, reprinted in 125 CONG. REc. E4291 (1979).
14. Quoted in The Oregonian (Portland), June 7, 1980, at 22, col. 1. The New York
Times failed to mention the Al-Fatah manifesto.
15. THE ECONOMIST, June 21, 1980, at 13.
16. PLO Dogma Renews Mideast Danger, The Oregonian (Portland), June 7, 1980, at
22, col. 1. The New Republic, June 14, 1980, at 9, notes that the only European reaction to
the unremitting perpetration of political terror is that "Palestinian murderers are called
Palestinian moderates." Two weeks later, upon further reflection, the editors of that same
journal angrily remarked that the European leaders "endorse the PLO even as the PLO
abandons all its petty pretenses to political maturity." Id., June 28, at 7.
17. N.Y. Times, June 15, 1980, at El, col. 2.
18. See J. BELL, THE MYTH oF THE GUERRILLA: REVOLUTIONARY THEORY AND MALPRAC-
TicE 171 (1971); D. HIRST, THE GUN AND THE OLIVE BRANCH: THE RooTs OF VIOLENCE IN THE'
MIDDLE EAST 272-73 (1977); T. KIERNAN, ARAFAT: THE MAN AND THE MYTH 232-34 (1976); B.
VALABREGA, LA REVOLUC16N ARABE 195-99, 212-14 (1971).
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designed as an instrument of Nasserite revenge upon Israel for the 1956
Suez humiliation, the PLO received its formal baptism on May 22, 1964,
with the convening of the First Palestinian National Congress. Shukairy's
keynote address set the tone of the organizational meeting, containing
such memorable phrases as "the liquidation of Israel," and "death to
Zionism."19
Of even greater significance, the Palestinian National Charter, last
amended in 1968, is brutually specific about the necessity for the destruc-
tion of Israel.20 Article 1 declares that Palestine "is an indivisible part of
the Arab homeland, and the Palestinian people are an integral part of the
Arab nation." Article 9 proclaims that "[a]rmed struggle is the only way
to liberate Palestine." Article 10 asserts that "[c]ommando action consti-
tutes the nucleus of the popular liberation war." Article 19 sums up the
current PLO position from which historically it has never wavered: "The
partition of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment of the state of Israel
are entirely illegal, regardless of the passage of time . . . ." Article 20
negates history and the international legal order: "The Balfour Declara-
tion, the mandate for Palestine and everything that has been based upon
them, are deemed null and void." Last, and certainly not least, Article 29
arrogates to the PLO the self-proclaimed "right" to determine what is
lawful and what is not, and which rules with respect to the operation of
the international state system shall be observed and which shall be disre-
garded: "The Palestinian people possess the fundamental and genuine le-
gal right to liberate and to retrieve their homeland. The Palestinian peo-
ple determine their attitude towards all states and forces on the basis of
the stands they adopt vis-d-vis the Palestinian cause .... "IS
On January 14, 1969, the Al-Fatah wing of the PLO, headed by Yas-
sir Arafat, issued a seven point political manifesto. Aside from the ritual
denunciation of the "colonialist ... racist . . . expansionist" state of
Israel, the major objective of this declaration was to hold out the vision of
an "independent democratic Palestinian state where all citizens, whatever
their creed, can enjoy equal rights. 22 The only problem, and one not
mentioned by Dr. Anis F. Kassim in his scholarly, civilized, and judicious-
minded study of the PLO's claim to juridical status in international law,2 8
19. T. KIERNAN, supra note 18, at 234.
20. The complete text of the Charter is reprinted in THE AA-IsRABLi CONFLCT. RRAD-
INGS AND DocuMENTs 1086-91 (J.N. Moore ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as ARAB-IsRAELI CON-
FLICT]; see also Lewis, The Palestinians and the PLO: A Historical Approach, COMMEN-
TARY, Jan. 1975, at 46-48.
21. This last claim was expanded upon by Yassir Arafat in his dramatic appearance
before the United Nations General Assembly on November 13, 1974. For a critique of the
Arafat thesis, see Rostow, The Illegality of the Arab Attack on Israel of October 6, 1973, in
AIAB-IsRAELI CONFLICT, supra note 20, at 458-59, 472, 474-75.
22. The text is reproduced in THE COMNG OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL: A REVOLUTION-
ARY ANTHOLOGY 233-34 (J. Gerassi ad. 1971) [hereinafter cited as REVOLuTiONARY
ANTHOLOGY].
23. Kassim, The Palestine Liberation Organization's Claim to Status: A Juridical
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is that a secular Palestinian state encompassing all parties in interest
must by its very nature require the elimination of the state of Israel. Ob-
viously, however, a Palestinian state composed of the West Bank and the
Gaza territory presents quite a different issue. The key question. here is:
What exactly is to be liberated? This point is never reached by Dr.
Kassim.24
Throughout the 1970's the Palestine Liberation Organization has
consistently maintained a radical Arab rejectionist position, refusing to
accept U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 and thereby impliedly recog-
nize the existence of the state of Israel,as and has constantly gone on re-
cord in favor of dismantling the Jewish state. The PLO's Ten Point Pro-
gram of June 8, 1974,'26 not only denounces Resolution 242 (Point 1), but
also threatens the destruction of King Hussein's Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan, which would be merged into a Greater Palestine (Point 5). As
always, the fundamental objective is declared to be the complete "libera-
tion of all Palestinian soil," which means, of course, the end of the state
of Israel (Point 8). In March 1977, the PLO National Council, in a new
Fifteen Point Program,' 7 once again rejected Resolution 242 (Point 1),
strongly denounced American interference (Point 4), pledged to carry the
liberation struggle into every Arab territory (Point 10), and pledged to
restore a Palestinian Palestine (Point 11). Most ominous is the assertion
that any law, treaty, convention, or agreement that is inimical to PLO
interests is unacceptable and non-binding (Point 15 B). Once again the
PLO has set itself up as the sole judge of its own actions by declaring that
any law which is not in its own interests is null and void. This is an egre-
gious violation of the spirit of the United Nations Charter, which the
PLO mentions so piously when it fits its interest to do so, and a blatant
refusal to abide by the rules of civilized conduct established by interna-
tional law. Apparently the only law that the PLO wishes to recognize on a
continuing basis is the law of the jungle.
A little more than a decade ago, an interview given by a high-ranking
Analysis Under International Law, 9 DzN. J. INT'L L & POL'Y 1 (1980). The moderation of
tone and dispassionate discourse in this thought-provoking article should be contrasted with
the acerbic and unreasoned emotion of E. SAm, THE QUESTION OF PAEMrM (1980).
24. See generally Kassim, note 23 supra.
25. See, e.g., TIME, Apr. 14, 1980, at 50; Interview with Zehdi Labib Terzi (PLO repre-
sentative to the United Nations), Another Voice, WHYY-TV (P.B.S.), Philadephia (May 24,
1980) [hereinafter cited as Terzi Interview]. Kassim, supra note 23, at 29, argues not very
persuasively that United States insistence on acceptance of Resolution 242, as a condition
precedent to PLO participation in the negotiation process, must fail because "recognition in
international law must be complete and not conditional ... " But his reference is only to
state recognition, and nowhere in his article does Dr. Kassim specifically demonstrate that
the PLO constitutes a state.
26. Ten Point Program of the Palestine National Council (June 8, 1974), reprinted in
NEW EAST REPORT, MYTHs AND FACTS 1978: A CONcisE RECORD OF THE ARAB-IsRAzu CON-
FLicr 70-72 (1978) [hereinafter cited as MYTHS AND FACTS]; Lewis, supra note 20, at 48.
. 27. Fifteen Point Program of the Palestine National Council (Mar. 1977), reprinted in
MYrHS AND FACTS, supra note 26, at 73-76.
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member of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP),
the radical terrorist wing of the PLO, made it perfectly clear that "the
legitimate right of the Hebrew nation to possess and establish its own
state" is totally unacceptable to the Palestinian people. 28 During an inter-
view with Time magazine in mid-April 1980, Yassir Arafat, as he had
done so many times, plainly refused to discuss the subject." The follow-
ing month, the PLO observer at the United Nations, Zehdi Labib Terzi,
left no doubt what the PLO program continues to be when he said that
the achievement of Palestinian independence "will be a long process
which entails violence, bloodshed, and misery. '9 0
The PLO has never ceased to embrace murder and barbarism as the
prime means of attaining its goal, even if the battlefield happens to be a
grade school (Ma'alot) or a kibbutz nursery (Misgav-Am). National liber-
ation struggles are one thing. World-wide terrorism is something else. It is
well established that the PLO has been engaged in a global program of
terror-violence with close links to other terrorist groups in disparate for-
eign countries, 1 that it acts as a training master and supply center s (go-
ing so far as to instruct the Ayatollah Khomeini's secret police in terrorist
techniques),88 and that it serves, on occasion, as a surrogate ally and dis-
bursement agent for the Soviet Union.8 The PLO campaign of terror-
28. Hillier, Democratic Popular Front: We Are Marxist-Leninists, in REVOLUTIONARY
ANTHOLOGY, supra note 22, at 244.
29. TIME, Apr. 14, 1980, at 49.
30. Terzi Interview, note 25 supra. Twice in December 1980 Arafat committed himself
to supporting Israel's destruction. See Milson, How to Make Peace with the Palestinians,
COMMENTARY, May 1981, at 28.
31. See 1 POLrrmcAL TERRORISM 3-81 (L. Sobel ed. 1975); 2 POLITICAL TERRORISM 15-85
(L. Sobel ed. 1978); PALESTINIAN IMPASSE: ARAB GUmuuuAS AND INTERNATIONAL TERROR 21-
165, 206-63 (L. Sobel ed. 1977). See also J. BECKER, HITLER's CHILDREN: THE STORY OF THE
BAADER-MEINHOFF TERRORIST GANG 15-18, 159, 292 (1977); 0. DEMARIS, BROTHERS IN BLOOD:
THE INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST NETWORK 67-180 (1977); C. DOBSON, BLACK SEPTEMBER: ITS
SHORT, VIOLENT HISTORY 42-171 (1974); A. PERRY, TERRORISM: FROM ROBESPIERRE TO
ARAFAT 435-40, 447-68, 563-76 (1976); Sterling, The Terrorist Network, THE ATLANTIC, Nov.
1978, at 37-47.
32. Sterling, supra note 31, at 39-46; Tinnin, Terror, Inc., PLAYBOY, May 1977, at 152-
54, 158, 166-82; Tinnan & Halevy, Strike Teams, PLAYBOY, Feb. 1979, at 92. See also R.
CLUTTEREUCK, KIDNAP AND RANSOM: THE RESPONSE 41-42, 49-52, 141-42 (1978); C. DOBSON &
R. PAYM, THE TERRORISTS: THEIR WEAPONS, LEADERS AND TACTICS 65-100 (1979); B.
HXGcsuN, TERRORISM: VXR TIDS KRIGFJRINO [WARFARE OF OUR TIMES] 172-73 (1978); A
PERRY, supra note 31, at 540-41; Homer, The Facts About Terrorism, COMMENTARY, June
1980, at 42-43; private information provided the author by the British Metropolitan Police,
Februrary 1980. Currently, the PLO is providing training for the Basque terrorist ETA. See
THE ECONOMIST, July 19, 1980, at 46. The PLO may also have reentered the assassination
arena with respect to foreign diplomats. Id., July 26, 1980, at 39; NEWSWEEK, Aug. 4, 1980, at
32, 35.
33. Moss, What Russia Wants, THE NEW REPUBLIC Jan. 19, 1980, at 25. Mr. Moss was
foreign editor of The Economist. There is also good reason to believe that the Israelis
helped train the Shah of Iran's notorious SAVAK. Cooley, supra note 13, at 1017. This does
not, however, justify the PLO's Iranian activities.
34. Originally, the PLO and its various affiliates allowed themselves to be used as surro-
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violence, which violates every human rights declaration and convention in
existence, 3  has been totally indiscriminate with respect to its victims."
As one Israeli commentator observed, "the PLO may be the only terrorist
organization anywhere that does not. even recognize the concept of inno-
cence among the population it opposes, that in fact seems to prefer at-
tacking civilian targets to military, killing schoolchildren rather than
soldiers . . ,.
Throughout modern history, advocates of revolutionary change have
argued that the end justifies the means, and that violent means are per-
missible and indeed desirable in order to attain revolutionary ends."
Much of present-day terrorism is political in origin, inextricably inter-
twined with so-called national liberation movements. National liberation
struggles have often adopted techniques of terror-violence as the most ex-
peditious method for achieving self-determination." In modern parlance,
gates for the Red Chinese in the 1960's and then switched over to the Soviet Union at the
beginning of the 1970's. See C. DOBSON & R. PAYNE, THE CARLOS Coms uix 36-38, 53-55
(1977); Z. SCHIFF & R. ROTHSTEIN, FEDAYEEN: GUERRILLAS AGAINST ISRAEL 210-17 (1972); C.
SMIrH, CARLOS: PORTRAIT OF A TERRORIST 56-67 (1976); Krosney, The PLO's Moscow Con-
nection, NEW YORK MAGAZINE, Sept. 24, 1979, at 64-72; The Miami Herald, Sept. 18, 1979,
at 1A, col. 1; id. Sept. 20, 1979, at 1A, col. 1. Also, Homer cynically observes that "it is at
the point when the Western democracies can no longer deny the facts of the relationship
between the PLO and the Soviet Union, that they begin to afford the organization greater
respectablity." Homer, supra, note 32, at 43-44.
35. On the role of international law and the use of terror-violence, see Franck, Interna-
tional Legal Action Concerning Terrorism, in 1 TERRoRIsM: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL 187
(1978); Friedlander, Terrorism and International Law: What Is Being Done?, 8 RuT.-CAM.
L.J. 383 (1977); Paust, A Survey of Possible Legal Responses to International Terrorism:
Prevention, Punishment, and Cooperative Action, 5 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 431, 462-69
(1975). The activities of the PLO violate not only the Universal Declaration, the two Inter-
national Covenants of 1966, and the Genocide Convention, but also the guarantee of human
rights and fundamental freedoms set forth in the U.N. Charter in art. 1, paras. 1, 2 and 3,
and art. 55, para c.
36. For example, bombs have been placed in pickle jars in market places and in tourist
shops in Arab bazaars. See Chicago Sun-Times, Jan. 19, 1979, at 6, col. 3; Chicago Tribune,
Sept. 17, 1978, at 2, col. 5.
37. Halkin, Whose Palestine? An Open Letter to Edward Said, COMMErARY, May
1980, at 27. The notorious Palestinian hijacker, Leila Khaled, who in Copenhagen in July
1980 represented the PLO at the United Nations Conference on the Decade of Women, told
a Time magazine correspondent in October 1970: "If we throw bombs, it is not our responsi-
bility. You may care for the death of a child, but the whole world ignored the death of
Palestinian children for 22 years. We are not responsible." Quoted in 1 PoLITIcAL TERROR-
isM, supra note 31, at 3. Nobel laureate Albert Camus anticipated this "defense" in his play
Just Assassins by having his terrorist protagonist exclaim: "I threw the bomb at your tyr-
anny, not at a man." The rejoinder: "There was blood, you know, a lot of blood." A.
C.Aus, CALIGULA AND THREE OTHER PLAYS 282 (S. Gilbert trans. 1958).
38. Apologists for the PLO argue that "terrorism was a weapon of the weak and of the
oppressed, of people who had no other means of fighting." D. HmST, supra note 18, at 316.
See also J. SCHREIBER, THE ULTIMATE WEAPON: TEREORISTS AND WORLD ORDER 137-38
(1978); G. McKNIGHT, THE TERRORIST MIND 24-27 (1974). For a legal critique of this self-
justificatory rationale, see Friedlander, Terrorism and Political Violence: Do the Ends Jus-
tify the Means?, 24 CHrrTY'S L.J. 240 (1976). Dr. Kassim is strangely silent on this issue.
39. See generally SELF-DETERMINATION: NATIONAL, REGIONAL, AND GLOBAL DIMENSIONS
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self-determination is almost always synonomous with national liberation
conflicts. At times the one is used as a code word for the other and also
used as a justification for terrorist acts, particularly on the part of so-
called guerrilla bands. 0 Dean Rusk's 1962 observation that success in ir-
regular warfare is self-legitimizing still holds true."' And the United Na-
tions has continually condoned rather than condemned such measures.
The United Nations definition of aggression, approved by consensus
on December 14, 1974, effectively exculpates terror-violence from any lia-
bility when employed on behalf of self-determination movements or
against colonial and racist regimes.42 In blunt, non-hyperbolic terminol-
ogy, the United Nations majority has opted for a philosophy of ends over
means when the ends happen to concide with the desires of the Third
World and the Soviet Bloc. Ironically, the Final Act of the often maligned
Helsinki declaration pledges the thirty-five signatory states to "refrain
from direct or indirect assistance to terrorist activities . . ."'I The ob-
vious contradiction between these two documents has not been resolved.
The effect of the legitimation of terror by the world community, through
such resolutions and agreements as the definition of aggression and the
1977 Protocol to the 1949 Geneva Convention on the Protection of Vic-
tims of International Armed Conflict,44 not only encourages third party
intervention on behalf of national liberation movements, but literally
turns self-determination claims into a license to kill. Has international
law, to use the terminology of Lord Simon of Glaisdale, conferred on Yas-
sir Arafat and his terrorist organization "immunity from the criminal
law"?"5
(Y. Alexander & R. Friedlander eds. 1980) [hereinafter cited as SELF-DETERMINATION]; Ty-
ner, Wars of National Liberation in Africa and Palestine: Self-Determination for Peoples
or for Territories?, 5 YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. ORDER 234 (1979).
40. See J. BELL, THE MYTH OF THE GUERRILLA: REVOLUTIONARY THEORY AND MALPRAC-
TICE (1971); G. CHALIAND, REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD WORLD: MYTHS AND PROSPECTS (1977).
41. P. WYDEN, BAY OF PIGS: THE UNTOLD STORY 147 (1979).
42. G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974). For
the long, tedious historical record of international negotiations leading to the definition, see
B. FERENCZ, DEFINING AGGRESSION-THE SEARCH FOR WORLD PEACE: A DOCUMENTARY SuR-
VEY AND ANALYSIS (2 vols. 1975). A decidedly negative analysis is provided in J. STONE, AG-
GRESSION AND WORLD ORDER: A CRITIQUE OF UNITED NATIONS THEORIES OF AGGRESSION
(1976).
43. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Final Act, reprinted in INT'L
LEGAL MAT. 1293, 1294-95 (1975); 73 Dm'T STATE BULL. 323, 325 (1975). For a useful legal
survey of the Helsinki Final Act, see Comment, The Conference on Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe: Implications for Soviet-American Dktente, 6 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 122
(1976).
44. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), adopted at Geneva
June 8, 1977, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1391
(1977). For contrasting interpretations of the new Protocol, see Dinstein, The New Geneva
Protocols: A Step Forward or Backward?, 33 Y.B. WORLD AFF. 265 (1979), and Bassiouni,
Repression of Breaches of the Geneva Convention Under the Draft Additional Protocol to
the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, 8 Rurr.-CAM. L.J. 185 (1977).
45. D.P.P. v. Lynch, [1975] A.C. 653, 687 (Lord Simon of Glaisdale, J., dissenting).
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The most extreme statement of support by the world community for
national liberation struggles is to be found in United Nations General As-
sembly Resolution 3103 of December 12, 1973, entitled "Basic Principles
of the Legal Status of Combatants Struggling Against Colonial and Alien
Domination and Racist Regimes.' 46 Granting to these rebellions a claim
of legitimacy under international law, Resolution 3103 declared that
"armed conflicts involving the struggle of peoples against colonial and ra-
cist regimes are to be regarded as international armed conflicts. . .," but
that "[tihe use of mercenaries by colonial and racist regimes against the
national liberation movements struggling for freedom and independence
from the yoke of colonialism and alien domination is considered to be a
criminal act and the mercenaries should accordingly be punished as
criminals."
Under this formula the Mauritanians who aided the Moroccans
against the Polisario Front were mercenaries, but the Cubans who fought
for (and against) the Angolans were legitimate combatants engaged in
permissible military intervention. Several years ago, the former Biafran
Minister of State remarked: "Biafra made a mistake in not trying terror-
ism. If we had terrorized, we would be independent today. The PLO has
shown how effective the use of terror can be in the international arena."' 7
Terrorism is at the core of the current Middle East crisis, and has af-
fected and afflicted the course" of history in that unhappy region for the
past two generations. 48
But what of the Palestinians? Do they also have a claim to national
legitimacy? The credo of contemporary Arab politics has become "self-
determination for the Palestinians," although the nature of that principle
is still much debated and much abused.' 9 There is no denying that self-
determination has been a major force during most of this century. None-
theless, what has been lacking with reference to international law is a
precise, definite, definable standard which may be fairly applied under
certain specified conditions.5 0 What lies at the heart of the problem is the
46. G.A. Res. 3103, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 142, U.N. Doc. 9030 (1973), re-
printed in 1 R. FRIEDLANDER, TERRORISM: DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL CON-
TROL 495-96 (1979).
47. Quoted in Friedlander, Sowing the Wind: Rebellion and Terror- Violence in Theory
and Practice, 6 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 83, 86 (1976). Terrorism was successful in the
Palestinian Mandate, Algeria, Cyprus, Kenya, Vietnam, and most recently, in Zimbabwe.
48. Dr. Kassim rationalizes this central, all-embracing issue by refusing "to pass a value
judgment on the coercion situations in which the PLO has been involved." He then broadly
asserts what he has not sought to explain: "The PLO has been able to exercise what
amounts to sovereign power over Palestinians in war situations." Kassim, supra note 23, at
22.
49. See generally SELF-DETERMINATION, supra note 39; Franck & Hoffman, The Right
of Self-Determination in Very Small Places, 8 N.Y.U. J. Ir'L L. & POL. 331 (1976); Note,
The Logic of Secession, 89 YALE L.J. 802 (1980).
50. See Paust, Self-Determination: A Definitional Focus, in SELF-DETERMINATION,
supra note 39, at 3-18; Friedlander, Self-Determination: A Legal-Political Inquiry, in id., at
307-31.
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curious conundrum that although self-determination is a collective con-
cept, no one has yet adequately defined what constitutes a people or
group. The most conspicuous failure to identify the potential parties for
whom a self-determination remedy is to be applied has been that of the
United Nations to give any precision to its wide-ranging statements of
principle.' The two major pronouncements on the subject can be found
in the well-known General Assembly Declaration on the Granting of Inde-
pendence to Colonial Countries and Territories (December 14, 1960),"s
and in the Annex of implementing General Assembly Resolution 1541
(December 15, 1960), dealing with non-self-governing territories." In the
former, no definition was given for the frequently utilized term "peoples,"
while the latter resolution generally defines free association but neglects
to specify precisely to whom the categories of association and self-govern-
ment will apply."
Existing legal norms and the historical record offer some definitional
means of clarification. A "people" consists of a community of individuals
bound together by mutual loyalties, an idei-x:ifiable tradition, and a com-
mon cultural awareness, with historic ties to a given territory. Their col-
lective behavior is based upon the pursuit and implementation of specific
goals which give to the community at large a group identity and a shared
sense of values. A "nation" is a community of peoples, adhering to a sin-
gle sovereignty, accepting mutually binding authority structures, and oc-
cupying a given territory within ascertainable geographic boundaries.
This collective entity, upon exercising political power and establishing so-
cial controls, becomes a nation-state, and its peoples are citizens
thereof."s In law and in fact there must be a positive link or rational
nexus between people and territory."
51. In a careful study, Umozurike argues that self-determination has become "law"
through its recognition by international bodies. Actually, custom and arbitrary state prac-
tice have prevented self-determination from achieving either the status of a peremptory
norm or the claims repeatedly made in its name by pro-liberationists. U. UMOZURIKE, SELF-
DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 182-203, 272 (1972).
52. G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
53. G.A. Res. 1541, Annex, id., at 29. See also Murphy, Self-Determination: United
States Perspectives, in SEFy-DTERmiNATION, supra note 39, at 50. G.A. Res. 742, 8 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 21, U.N. Doc. A/2630 (1953), sets out in greater detail, but similar
scope, various factors to be considered regarding the transformation of a dependent terri-
tory into a self-governing entity.
54. For an incisive analysis of both documents, see Clark, Self-Determination and Free
Association-Should the United Nations Terminate the Pacific Islands Trust?, 21 HAlv.
INT'L L.J. 1, 41-46 (1980).
55. These definitions are taken from Friedlander, Proposed Criteria for Testing the
Validity of Self-Determination as it Applies to Disaffected Minorities, 25 CHrrr's L.J.
335, 336 (1977). Anthony D'Amato raises the jurisprudential query: "Who is to be a 'repre-
sentative' of a 'nation'? .... If we cannot decide this in an a priori fashion, then there
appears to be an inconsistency in the 'self' part of the phrase 'self-determination."'
D'Amato, International Law and Rawls' Theory of Justice, 5 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 525,
533 (1975).
56. One must beware of oversimplifications like the comment of Judge Hardy Dillard in
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According to United Nations practice, a "people" is any group that
august organization wishes to liberate from "colonial and racist regimes."
Thus, the Puerto Ricans are a people but the Kurds are not; the Namibi-
ans are a people and possess their own state but the population of East
Timor (or what remains of it) is without identity and without hope. Pal-
estinian liberation has become a United Nations obsession,5" but who re-
members the Tibetans and who dares to recall Latvia, Lithuania, and Es-
tonia? Military conquest is proscribed and annexation of territory by
force of arms is condemned by international law," unless the conqueror
happens to be a super-power who is not afraid to use brute force against
those who would challenge its methods and their consequences.
The roots of the current Arab-Israeli conflict grow out of two con-
flicting sets of rights: the right of Israel to exist as a state, first enunciated
by the League of Nations, then created by the United Nations; and the
right of the Palestinians to secure control of their own future by means of
self-determination. For a variety of reasons-some religious, some politi-
cal, some historical-the rights of both peoples have proved to be mutu-
ally incompatible during more than half of this century. Must they con-
tinue to be so?
At this point in history no one can deny the validity of the Palestin-
ian claims to self-determination in those territories which remain today
uniquely or preponderantly Palestinian. The Israeli government of
Menachem Begin and its successors must face up to the hard fact and
cold reality that the Palestinian Arabs of the West Bank and Gaza have
an international right to express themselves politically and a strong claim
of right to constitute themselves into a sovereign political entity. How-
ever, the assertion that the PLO is "a territorial public body" and pos-
sesses international juridical status" has no foundation in international
his separate advisory opinion on the Western Sahara Case: "It is for the people to determine
the destiny of the territory and not the territory the destiny of the people." Advisory Opin-
ion on Western Sahara, [1975] I.C.J. 12, 122 (separate opinion of Dillard, J.). But without
"people" and without territory there can be no claim. As with many legal arguments, self-
determinative claims of right are a matter of focus. Radley asserts that "the uniqueness of
the Palestinian claim is that it finds little support in international law ...." Radley, The
Palestinian Refugees: The Right to Return in International Law, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 586,
611 (1978).
57. See Mallison & Mallison, An International Law Analysis of the Major United Na-
tions Resolutions Concerning the Palestine Question, in U.N. Doc. ST/SG/SER.F/4
(1979)(United Nations Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestin-
ian People). The United States has steadfastly opposed both the creation and the existence
of this Committee. See the statement of Ambassador Andrew Young, 79 DEP'T STATE BULL.
51 (1979).
58. Gerson makes the interesting argument that Israel is acting as a trustee-occupant of
the West Bank Territory. Gerson, Trustee-Occupant: The Legal Status of Israel's Pres-
ence in the West Bank, 14 HARv. INT'L L.J. 1 (1973). Silverburg, "Uti Possidetis" and "Paz
Palestiniana": A Proposal, 16 DuQ. L. REv. 757 (1977-78), is neither practical nor indicative
of the weight of authority in the post-Charter era.
59. Kassim, supra note 23, at 26. In December 1975 the U.S. representative in the U.N.
Security Council denounced the proposal to allow the PLO to participate in the debate on
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law. To compare it with regional or international agencies such as the
European Coal and Steel Community, the Organization of American
States (a regional group of nation-states which is subject to the provi-
sions of Article 52 of the United Nations Charter), the Food and Agricul-
ture Organization, and the International Labor Organization, 0 makes as
much sense as comparing apples and artichokes. Private bodies, or public
bodies, even if granted international personality (such as corporations),
do not take on the attributes of nation-states. 1
The so-called "diplomatic recognition" granted the PLO by well over
100 different governmentsss is a political recognition. It cannot be a dip-
lomatic recognition since, despite claims to the contrary, the PLO does
not constitute a state. To compare the PLO with the Polish Government-
in-Exile during either world war, or the Free French Government, or any
similar wartime national group,6" is misleading at best and is an insult to
the historic memory of those organizations. They did not violate interna-
tional law, did not wage war upon the innocent, and did not maintain
their claims to public authority by a program of murder and intimidation
directed against their national oppositionists. In point of fact, the Free
French and all resistance movements operated by a code of honor which
sought to protect innocent civilians."
The inexorable dilemma confronting those who seek a just, fair, and
equitable Middle East settlement has been the difficulty of separating
Palestinian needs, aspirations, and goals from those of the PLO. There
are no moderate Palestinian political leaders, either outside or within the
PLO, because the radical leadership of that organization has not permit-
ted it. Dissident moderates have been eliminated by an assassination
Lebanon as an "egregious attempt to use this body to deal with an amorphous terrorist
organization as though it were a concrete entity with the attributes of a sovereign Govern-
ment." Gross, Voting in the Security Council and the PLO, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 470, 477
(1976).
60. Kassim, supra note 23, at 7-8.
61. In particular, see the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec.
26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, T.S. No. 881, 165 U.N.T.S. 19, article 1 of which provides: "The
State as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a
permanent population; (b) a defined territory;, (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into
relations with the other States." This formulation is generally accepted by most commenta-
tors and is "often adopted in substance by jurists." I. BROWNLIE, PINCWLES OF PUBLIC IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 74 (3d ed. 1979).
62. Kassim, supra note 23, at 19 n.101, gives 103 as the number of recognizing govern-
ments as of 1974. Yassir Arafat claimed 115 in a meeting with Reverend Jesse Jackson in
October 1979. Jackson, A New Formula for Mideast Peace, The Chattanooga Times, Oct.
16, 1979, at A8, col. 1. In the Terzi interview, note 25 supra, Terzi made the claim in May
1980 that the PLO had between 80 and 90 full diplomatic missions in approximately 120
countries.
63. Kassim, supra note 23, at 31-33.
64. See, e.g., 1 R. ARON, HisToma DE L'tPURATION (1967); H. FRENAY, THE NIGHT WELL
END: MEMOIRS OF A REVOLUTIONARY (1976); RESISTANCE IN EUROPE, 1939-1945 (S. HAWES &
R. WHITE DS. 1976).
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campaign waged throughout Europe and the Middle East" The Palestin-
ian people are adherents to PLO leadership by way of coercion and intim-
idation.68 It is therefore no wonder that President Anwar Sadat has de-
nounced the PLO's "murder for murder's sake" attitude, adding that
"[tihe fate of nations is being played with just as children play with toys
on the streets. 67 This is exactly what the Israelis fear from a PLO-domi-
nated state.
Before the PLO Charter of 1964 and the Israeli occupation of 1967,
the Palestinians neither expressed any nationalistic desires nor evidenced
a national consciousness to any meaningful degree." Moreover, the
United Nations discerned no Palestinian "right" to self-determination
until December 10, 1969 .1s Nevertheless, since those dates, with Israel as
the catalyst, a Palestinian national movement has gone on to receive, in
countless resolutions and declarations, overwhelming United Nations sup-
port for application of the self-determination principle to the Palestinian
people.
7 °
On November 18, 1979, in a television interview on station WEPC in
West Palm Beach, Florida, United Nations Secretary-General Kurt
Waldheim referred to the PLO as "the elected representative of the Pal-
estinian people." With this kind of objective detachment it is not surpris-
ing that United Nations impartiality and its power of moral suasion have
become, to the Israelis if not to world popular opinion, inherently suspect.
A similar attitude was clearly implicit on November 22, 1974, when the
General Assembly overwhelmingly endorsed the creation of a Palestinian
state and granted the PLO permanent observer status at the United Na-
65. For an introduction to this phenomenon, see War Among the Terrorists, Nzws-
WEEK, Aug. 14, 1978, at 25-27. After the assassination of the former Syrian Prime Minister,
Salah Eddin al Bitar, in Paris during late July 1980, the Gaullist publication La Nation
complained: "If the PLO rents its services to Iranian fanatics... should we not reconsider
our attitude to the PLO?" The Hit Men Strike Again, NEwsWEEK Aug. 4, 1980, at 35.
66. Rashad al Shawa, Mayor of Gaza, at one time the target of several PLO assassina-
tion attempts, now makes frequent trips to Beirut to confer with Yassir Arafat. NzwswK,
June 9, 1980, at 57. See also Milson, supra note 30, at 33-34.
67. Detroit Free Press, Oct. 11, 1978, at 20D, col. 2. The Palestinian internecine strife
confused and confounded American policy under the Carter Administration. See the
thoughtful observations of Miller, Morality in Foreign Policy: A Failed Consensus?, 109
DAEDALUs 143, 151-53 (1980).
68. See Lewis, supra note 20, at 32-38. The Palestinian Arabs were, historically, hostile
to Palestinian Jews, not nationalistic in their own right. See Origines et evolution du
probl~me Palestinian, premiere partie: 1917-1947, in U.N. Doc. ST/SG/SER.F/1 (1978)
(United Nations Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian
People); J. BELL, TERROR OUT OF ZION: THE VIOLENT AND DEADLY SHOCK TROOPS OF ISRAEL
INDEPENDENCE, 1929-1949, at 1-59 (1977). A distinguished Hebrew University historian over
more than two generations writes: "We [Israeli Jews] educated the Arabs about nationalism.
It was our very existence that created Arab national consciousness." Scholem, The Threat of
Messianism, N.Y. Rev. Books, Aug. 14, 1980, at 22.
69. G.A. Res. 2535 B, 24 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 25, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969).
70. See Mallison & Mallison, supra note 57, at 40-48.
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tions.7 1 Even more significant than the wording of the resolutions was the
failure of the Assembly to take cognizance of Security Council Resolution
242, which calls for acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integ-
rity, and political independence of all states involved in the 1967 War,
'
or to indicate in any way whatsoever the legitimacy and the right of Israel
to exist as an independent entity.78 Yet, despite a hostile international
climate-over two-thirds of the United Nations membership has recog-
nized the PLO in one way or another-Israel has refused to negotiate the
modalities of its own demise, relying upon the ancient legal maxim ex
injuria jus non oritur (rights do not arise from wrongs).7 4
The language of United Nations resolutions and declarations on the
Palestinian issue since these events has, if anything, grown more inflam-
matory. Neither in the General Assembly, nor in its major committees
and their subcommittees, nor in the Security Council, the Economic and
Social Council, or the Trusteeship Council, nor in any of the specialized
and related agencies, has there been any indication of the right of Israel
to exist as an independent member of the world community. In fact, at
the special emergency session of the General Assembly summoned by
Secretary-General Waldheim on July 21, 1980, under provisions of the
rarely invoked Uniting for Peace Resolution," the prime purpose was to
be the granting of the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza to
the PLO .7 Petroleum politics, petrodollar diplomacy, and Third World
hostility have combined to undermine and to challenge Israel's rightful
place in the community of nations, and by so doing, to strip away her
71. G.A. Res. 3236, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 4, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974); G.A.
Res. 3237, id. See also G.A. Res. 3375, 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 3, U.N. Doc. A/10034
(1975), by which the Assembly called for the invitation of the PLO "to participate in all
efforts, deliberations and conferences on the Middle East which are held under the auspices
of the United Nations ......
72. S.C. Res. 242, 22 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Res. & Dec.) 8-9, U.N. Doc. S/INF/22/Rev.2
(1967). A summary of the Security Council debate is provided in the Report of the Security
Council, 16 July 1967-15 July 1968, 23 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 2) 9-23, U.N. Doc. A/7202
(1968).
73. Commenting upon past and present U.N. developments, Rubin observes: "The en-
tire peace and security machinery of the United Nations has been degraded." Rubin, UN
Resolutions Too Heavy for Delicate Tasks, Mar. 28, 1980, at 22, col. 2.
74. Hans Kelsen rejects application of the maxim as a general rule. His is, however, a
minority view. H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 215-16 (2nd ed. 1966).
75. G.A. Res. 377, 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 10, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950).
76. The Blade (Toledo), July 22, 1980, at 1, col. 2; Chicago Tribune, July 23, 1980, at
16, col. 1. This followed an earlier attempt in the Security Council to pass a resolution,
vetoed by the United States, calling for Palestinian statehood. The four West European
members of the Council abstained. The Blade, May 1, 1980, at 1, col. 1. On July 29, 1980,
the General Assembly voted 112-7, with 24 abstentions (including all the Common Market
countries), for a resolution sponsored by the Communist and so-called non-aligned blocs
which would require Israel to withdraw from occupied Arab territories by November 15,
1980. The United States voted against this resolution on the grounds that it did not recog-
nize Israel's right to exist. Id., July 30, 1980, at 1, col. 4; Chicago Tribune, July 30, 1980, at 1
col. 1. See also U.N. CHRON., Sept.-Oct. 1980, at 5-18.
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historic and legal foundations.
There are those who somehow remain optimistic that reason will yet
prevail, even in the land of the scorpion and the frog. However, there
seems to be a growing belief among Western intellectuals and some politi-
cal leaders that the current phenomenon of hostage-taking is not simply
criminal, that its perpetrators are forced to such measures in order "to
equalize power in a conflict, and in doing so to publicize a perceived in-
justice."' 7 But what of the greater injustice resulting from the attack
upon the innocent?78 Must the rhetoric of outrage, the ideology of resent-
ment, and the propaganda of the deed become the dominant dialogue of
the 1980's?7 ' Should every patently aggrieved, ideologically motivated,
politically alienated group be able to bomb its way to the negotiating ta-
ble? In the words of Wieseltier, "the terrorist chooses to kill, not because
he is a reasonable man at his rope's end, but because he is an unreasona-
ble man who belongs at the end of a rope."80
A guerrilla victory will become as meaningless as last week's oil
prices if terror-violence is legitimated merely because it is committed in
the name of national liberation. Where does it end? Who benefits by a
Darwinian global order?
In the conclusion of his thoughtful and provocative personal odyssey,
To Jerusalem and Back, Nobel laureate Saul Bellow sadly observed that
"the eagerness to kill for political ends-or to justify killing by such
ends-is as keen now as it ever was."81 With the legalization of terror-
violence in the name of self-determination, with the use of national liber-
ation struggles as a means of surrogate warfare, the great powers and the
Arab rulers are lighting confrontation fires on a very short fuse. To fail to
recognize this, and to reject the rule of law for the rule of force, is to fan
the flames of mindless passion. The inevitable explosion may well engulf
us all.
77. Stone, Plebes and Patricians, N.Y. Rev. Books, May 29, 1980, at 46.
78. See A. CAMUS, RESISTANCE, REBELLION, AN DEATH 111-49 (J. O'Brien trans. 1961).
79. According to Yassir Arafat's famous speech before the U.N. General Assembly on
November 13, 1974, "[w]hoever stands by a just cause and fights for liberation from invad-
ers and colonialists cannot be called terrorist." U.N. CHRON. Dec. 1974, at 80-81.
80. Wieseltier, The Sabbath Ambush, THE NEw REPUBLIC, May 24, 1980, at 23. Khalidi
offers the simplistic justification that "Israel and the PLO are at war with one another and
war is terror." This is not only feckless argumentation, it is also legal nonsense. Khalidi,
Regiopolitics: Toward a U.S. Policy on the Palestine Problem, 59 FOREIGN AFF. 1050, 1060
(1981).
81. S. BELLOW, To JERUSALEM AND BACK: A PERSONAL ACCOUNT 182 (1977). Silverburg
correctly notes that "nothing in the U.N. Charter suggests that violence is the answer."
Silverburg, The Palestine Liberation Organization in the United Nations: Implications for
International Law and Relations, 12 ISRAEL L. REv. 365, 375 (1977).
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